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I. Introduction 
Same-sex-marriage bans implicate several constitutional provi-
sions. Federal equal-protection and due-process guarantees are best 
understood as precluding states from prohibiting same-sex marriages. 
Even bracketing those protections, privileges-and-immunities guaran-
tees require states to recognize certain same-sex marriages validly cel-
ebrated elsewhere. Furthermore, Congress has exceeded its power in 
passing the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which has im-
plications for those states refusing to recognize same-sex marriage for 
any purpose. The analysis offered here examines a number of different 
constitutional protections including the equal-protection, due-process, 
and privileges-and-immunities guarantees contained within the Four-
teenth Amendment as well as those provided by the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause. 
This Article’s equal-protection analysis discusses the constitution-
ality of same-sex-marriage bans in light of the differing tiers of scru-
tiny. The due process analysis explains that the societal and individual 
interests served by marriage are promoted whether the couple is com-
 
 * Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio. This pa-
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posed of individuals of the same sex or of different sexes. The privi-
leges-and-immunities discussion focuses on some of the respects in 
which states are precluded from refusing to recognize the rights of 
same-sex couples, congressional authorization to discriminate not-
withstanding. Finally, the article discusses existing full-faith-and-credit 
guarantees and their implications both for DOMA and for state mini-
DOMAs. This Article concludes that numerous federal constitutional 
guarantees are violated by the system of same-sex-marriage bans that 
is currently in place. 
II. Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution 
The analysis here suggests that same-sex-marriage bans violate 
both equal-protection and due-process guarantees. If that is correct 
then it is of course true that states are precluded from refusing to rec-
ognize same-sex marriages validly celebrated in sister states. Nonethe-
less, right-to-travel guarantees provide additional guarantees for indi-
viduals who have celebrated same-sex marriages in their domiciles in 
accord with local law. Further, because Congress exceeded its powers 
when enacting the Defense of Marriage Act, states are constitutionally 
prohibited from refusing to recognize same-sex marriages for all pur-
poses. 
A. Equal Protection 
The seminal marriage case is Loving v. Virginia1 in which the Court 
struck down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law on equal-protection 
and due-process grounds.2 Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving, Virginia 
domiciliaries,3 married in the District of Columbia in 1958 in accord 
with local law,4 and made their marital home in Virginia.5 Later that 
same year, they were charged with violating Virginia’s anti-miscegena-
tion laws.6 They pled guilty and were given a year in jail, sentence sus-
pended on the condition that they not appear together in the state for 
 
 1. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 2. Id. at 2 (“For reasons which seem to us to reflect the central meaning of those consti-
tutional commands [due process and equal protection], we conclude that these statutes cannot 
stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 3. Id. (describing the couple as “two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, 
and Richard Loving, a white man”). 
 4. Id. (noting that they “were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws”). 
 5. Id. (noting that “the Lovings . . . established their marital abode in Caroline County”). 
 6. Id. at 3 (describing that “a grand jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings with 
  
301] The Unconstitutionality of Same-Sex-Marriage Bans 
 303 
the next twenty-five years.7 “[T]he Lovings took up residence in the 
District of Columbia.”8 A few years later, the Lovings sought to vacate 
the judgment on the ground that it violated Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees.9 
Several Virginia statutes were implicated in the Lovings’ convic-
tion and sentencing. The first statute specified that if members of an 
interracial couple went to another jurisdiction to marry with the inten-
tion of returning to the state, their marriage would be treated as if it 
had been celebrated locally and the individuals would be subject to the 
criminal penalty that would be applicable were they to have tried to 
marry within the state.10 The second statute specified that attempting 
to marry someone of another race was punishable by imprisonment for 
one to five years.11 A third statute specified that interracial marriages 
were to be treated as void ab initio.12 
The Loving Court addressed whether Virginia’s prohibiting indi-
viduals of different races from marrying violated federal equal-protec-
tion and due-process guarantees, although much of the Court’s focus 
was on the former.13 The Loving Court rejected Virginia’s “contention 
that these statutes should be upheld if there is any possible basis for 
concluding that they serve a rational purpose,”14 instead requiring “the 
very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment 
has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.”15 
 
violating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages”). 
 7. Id. (“[T]he Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year in jail; 
however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the 
Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years.”). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 4 (“If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for the 
purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and 
afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as pro-
vided in § 20–59, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized 
in this State.”). 
 11. Id. (“If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person in-
termarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement 
in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.”). 
 12. Id. at 4 n.3 (“All marriages between a white person and a colored person shall be ab-
solutely void without any decree of divorce or other legal process.”). 
 13. The Loving decision is only thirteen pages, and the equal-protection analysis started 
on page seven and ended on page twelve, see id. at 7–12, whereas the due-process discussion was 
only on page page. See id. at 12. 
 14. Id. at 8. 
 15. Id. at 9. 
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Where that heavier burden of justification was required, the Court 
found that the Virginia statutory scheme could not pass constitutional 
muster.16 
It is of course true that state statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage 
do not discriminate on the basis of race, and it is not claimed here that 
such statutes should trigger close scrutiny because they discriminate 
on that forbidden basis. But merely because such statutes do not dis-
criminate on the basis of race does not entail that such bans should be 
examined with the most forgiving level of scrutiny. Indeed, it is im-
portant to remember that when Loving was decided, equal-protection 
jurisprudence was in an embryonic stage—the Court had not yet struck 
down sex-based classifications as violating equal-protection guaran-
tees.17 
The chronology is important to consider because, otherwise, there 
is a danger that Court precedents will be misunderstood. Consider 
Baker v. Nelson,18 in which the Minnesota Supreme Court considered 
whether Loving suggested that Minnesota’s same-sex-marriage ban vi-
olated constitutional guarantees. 
Loving does indicate that not all state restrictions upon the right to 
marry are beyond reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in com-
monsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction 
between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based 
upon the fundamental difference in sex.19 
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the Baker decision “for 
want of a substantial federal question,”20 and some courts have consid-
ered Baker binding precedent with respect to the constitutionality of 
same-sex-marriage bans.21 But that is error for a few reasons. First, it 
might be noted that in 1956 the Court in Naim v. Naim refused to hear 
a challenge to Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute because the case 
 
 16. Id. at 12 (“There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because 
of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 17. It was not until four years later when the Court struck down a sex-based classification 
in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 18. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
 19. Id. at 187. 
 20. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972). 
 21. Randy Beck, Transtemporal Separation of Powers in the Law of Precedent, 87 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 1405, 1449 (2012) (noting that “a number of lower courts have viewed Baker as a binding 
precedent conclusively rejecting claims seeking to establish a right to same-sex marriage under 
the United States Constitution”). 
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was “devoid of a properly presented federal question.”22 A mere eleven 
years later, the Loving Court struck down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation 
law.23 
What had happened in the interim? In 1964, the Court in 
McLaughlin v. Florida struck down a Florida law punishing interracial 
fornication and adultery more severely than intra-racial fornication 
and adultery, reasoning that the state’s legitimate purposes could be 
adequately served by laws that did not expressly distinguish on the ba-
sis of race.24 The McLaughlin Court expressly refused to address the 
constitutionality of Florida’s interracial marriage ban,25 although the 
Loving Court struck down such bans a mere three years later.26 
Just as McLaughlin might be thought an important change in the 
jurisprudence even while claiming not to be addressing the constitu-
tionality of the Florida marriage ban, Lawrence v. Texas might be 
thought an analogous important change, because in Lawrence the 
Court struck down Texas’s criminalization of same-sex relations.27 The 
Lawrence Court made eminently clear that it was not addressing the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage,28 although a separate issue is 
whether Lawrence has implications for the constitutionality of same-
sex-marriage bans.29 
Another reason that the Court’s refusal to hear Baker should not 
be thought controlling is that the Court did not settle on intermediate 
scrutiny for sex-based classifications until 1976.30 The Minnesota 
 
 22. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). 
 23. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 24. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (“Florida has offered no argument 
that the State’s policy . . . cannot be as adequately served by the general, neutral, and existing ban 
on illicit behavior as by a provision such as § 798.05 which singles out the promiscuous interracial 
couple for special statutory treatment.”). 
 25. Id. at 195 (“[E]ven if we posit the constitutionality of the ban against the marriage of 
a Negro and a white, it does not follow that the cohabitation law is not to be subjected to inde-
pendent examination under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 26. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 1. 
 27. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 28. See id. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the government must 
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”). 
 29. See id. at 604–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of 
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homo-
sexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”). 
 30. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199–200 (1976) (“[T]he protection of public health 
and safety represents an important function of state and local governments. However, appellees’ 
statistics in our view cannot support the conclusion that the gender-based distinction closely 
serves to achieve that objective and therefore the distinction cannot under Reed withstand equal 
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court’s analysis might have been quite different had it been in light of 
the heightened scrutiny afforded to sex-based classifications—the 
court certainly would not have simply said that while marital re-
strictions based on race could not pass muster, a distinction based upon 
the “fundamental difference in sex”31 surely could. While it is conceiv-
able that a court using intermediate scrutiny would nonetheless uphold 
the constitutionality of a same-sex-marriage ban, the current jurispru-
dence requires a sex-based classification to be based on an “exceedingly 
persuasive justification,”32 and two state supreme courts have struck 
down their respective state’s same-sex-marriage ban when employing 
intermediate scrutiny under state constitutional guarantees.33 Not 
only would the Minnesota court’s analysis have been different, but the 
U.S. Supreme Court would likely not have said that no substantial fed-
eral issue was implicated, precisely because state classifications based 
on sex implicate federal equal-protection guarantees. 
Suppose that a case mirroring Baker were to reach the Minnesota 
Supreme Court and that court were again to find that the state’s same-
sex-marriage ban classified on the basis of sex.34 Such a finding would 
not end the analysis—under the current jurisprudence, the court would 
then have to determine whether the “classification serves ‘important 
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ 
are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’”35 
Perhaps the Minnesota court’s analysis would mirror that of other state 
supreme courts examining same-sex-marriage bans with intermediate 
scrutiny and the court would find that such a ban could not pass mus-
ter. In any event, assuming that certiorari were granted, the U.S. Su-
preme Court would have to address several issues including whether 
such bans classify on the basis of sex. 
 
protection challenge.”); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“Between these extremes 
of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally 
has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex . . . .” (citing Miss. Univ. for Women 
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723–24 n.9 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976))). 
 31. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971). 
 32. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724). 
 33. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 34. Such a case is going through the Minnesota courts. See Benson v. Alverson, No. A11-
811, 2012 WL 171399, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2012) (“But the district court improperly 
relied on Baker in analyzing appellants’ remaining claims; therefore, the district court erred in 
dismissing appellants’ equal-protection, due-process, and freedom-of-association claims on the 
merits at this stage in the proceedings.”). 
 35. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724). 
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Why would a court find that a same-sex-marriage ban classifies on 
the basis of sex? Because such a statute expressly classifies based on the 
genders of the parties: a man can marry a woman but not a man, and a 
woman can marry a man but not a woman. But, it might be argued, 
such statutes are designed to target orientation rather than sex. Yet, 
regardless of the purported target, classifying on the basis of a re-
stricted classification suffices to trigger closer scrutiny. For example, 
one could not immunize a race-based classification from close review 
by claiming that one wished to target wealth and that one was merely 
using a race-based classification as a proxy for wealth.36 
If the fact of classifying on the basis of sex is not enough to trigger 
intermediate scrutiny, one might wonder what else would be required. 
Consider the argument offered by the Vermont Supreme Court in 
Baker v. State, namely, that the “test to evaluate whether a facially gen-
der-neutral statute discriminates on the basis of sex is whether the law 
‘can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.’”37 The difficulty with the 
Vermont court’s analysis is that a statute that permits a man to marry 
a woman but not a man and a woman to marry a man but not a woman 
is not neutral on its face. 
One sense of sex-neutrality requires that the employed terms not 
be gender-laden. If one uses a term like “man” or “woman” or “hus-
band” or “wife,” then one is using a sex-linked term. If, instead, one 
uses a term like “person” or “spouse” or “veteran,” then one is using a 
sex-neutral term because those terms might be used to refer to a man 
or a woman.38 
The test of neutrality used by the Vermont court did not involve 
whether the terms themselves were gender-neutral but, instead, the ef-
fects of the statute. The court reasoned that the ban was neutral be-
cause the sexes were affected equally. But such an analysis is faulty for 
two distinct reasons. First, the ban was not sex-neutral in that the clas-
sification expressly employed sex-based terms. Second, to find out 
 
 36. Targeting on the basis of wealth would not trigger close scrutiny. See San Antonio In-
dep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that poverty does not trigger close scru-
tiny). 
 37. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 (1999) (citing Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256, 272 (1970)). 
 38. Ironically, the Baker court failed to understand that the case it cited in support, Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, undercut the Baker analysis rather than supported it. At issue in Feeney were veter-
ans’ benefits, and the Feeney Court explicitly pointed out that the term “veteran” was “gender-
neutral,” id. at 267, and also that the term included “[w]omen who have served in official United 
States military units during wartime.” Id. at 268. 
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whether the statute was “neutral” in the sense that it affected the sexes 
equally, one would presumably want to know whether more women 
would thereby be prevented from marrying than would men. Even if 
one could figure out the appropriate measurement (e.g., absolute num-
bers, percentages, etc.), there might be some difficulty in discovering 
the information. One could perform surveys—would you marry your 
same-sex partner if you could?—but those numbers might not accu-
rately reflect the number of people who would actually wed if given 
the opportunity. Regardless of whether one could figure out whether 
same-sex-marriage bans place a disproportionate burden on one sex, 
the more important difficulty is that this is simply the wrong question 
to ask in this case. 
When the state of Virginia argued that its anti-miscegenation law 
passed constitutional muster, it did not claim that the statute was neu-
tral on its face, but instead argued that the admittedly racial classifica-
tion was nonetheless permissible: “the State contends that, because its 
miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro 
participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their re-
liance on racial classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimi-
nation based upon race.”39 Here, Virginia at least recognized that it 
was classifying on the basis of race, although it erred in suggesting that 
“the mere ‘equal application’ of a statute containing racial classifica-
tions is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s proscription of all invidious racial discriminations.”40 
Basically, Virginia was arguing that because whites could marry whites 
but not blacks and blacks could marry blacks but not whites, the state 
was employing a racial classification but not invidiously. In contrast, 
the Vermont Supreme Court would analogously say that because 
whites could marry whites but not blacks and blacks could marry blacks 
but not whites, the state was not employing a racial classification at 
all.41 After all, the court would presumably reason, neither blacks nor 
whites were permitted to enter into an interracial marriage, so the stat-
ute was neutral on its face. Such an interpretation of neutrality had 
 
 39. Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1966). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Cf. Mark Strasser, Equal Protection at the Crossroads: On Baker, Common Benefits, and 
Facial Neutrality, 42 Ariz. L. Rev. 935, 957 (2000) (“according to its own analysis, the Baker court 
would have to have upheld the statute at issue in McLaughlin”). The Baker court might have struck 
down the statutes at issue in Loving because Virginia’s use of allegedly “neutral” terms was none-
theless invidious in purpose and effect.  
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already been rejected by the Court before Loving.42 
The Vermont Supreme Court could have said that although the 
state was employing a sex-based classification, that classification was 
not invidious. But the court could only find that the classification was 
not invidious after having employed intermediate scrutiny. The court 
would not have found that such a ban passed muster under intermedi-
ate scrutiny, given its having struck down Vermont’s reserving mar-
riage benefits for different-sex couples even when employing a less de-
manding level of scrutiny. 
A separate and additional basis for striking down a same-sex-mar-
riage ban on equal-protection grounds is that targeting on the basis of 
orientation might itself trigger heightened scrutiny, a position sup-
ported by the Obama Administration.43 Were that position adopted by 
the Court, there would be two reasons to employ the intermediate 
scrutiny standard: first, such bans classify on a triggering basis (sex), 
and second, they target on a triggering basis (orientation). There 
would be no need to choose one rather than the other, since each would 
trigger the same standard.44 
Even if a court were reluctant to hold that targeting on the basis of 
orientation triggers intermediate scrutiny, it might nonetheless employ 
a level of scrutiny more demanding than the very deferential rational 
basis test. In Romer v. Evans45 and Lawrence v. Texas,46 the U.S. Supreme 
Court did not use the most forgiving level of scrutiny when striking 
down statutes targeting on the basis of sexual orientation. It is simply 
 
 42. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10 (“[A]s recently as the 1964 Term, in rejecting the reasoning of 
that case [Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)], we stated ‘Pace represents a limited view of the 
Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this 
Court.’” (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964))). 
 43. See Mark Strasser, DOMA, the Constitution, and the Promotion of Good Public Policy, 
5 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 613, 623 (2012) (“The Obama administration has suggested that statutes 
targeting on the basis of orientation should be subjected to heightened scrutiny.”). 
 44. When analyzing that state’s same-sex-marriage ban, the California Supreme Court 
seemed to think that it had to choose between discrimination on the basis of sex and discrimina-
tion on the basis of orientation. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 439 (Cal. 2008) (superseded 
by constitutional amendment as stated in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59 (Cal. 2009)) (“For 
purposes of determining the applicable standard of judicial review under the California equal 
protection clause, we conclude that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation cannot ap-
propriately be viewed as a subset of, or subsumed within, discrimination on the basis of sex.”). 
Regardless of whether the court’s conclusion was correct as a general matter, the court was in-
correct about the ban at issue, because the ban classified on the basis of sex and targeted on the 
basis of orientation. 
 45. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 46. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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unclear whether, in those cases, the Court was using a rational-basis-
with-bite standard47 or something more demanding, but in any event 
the Court struck down both of those state laws. 
Would the Supreme Court strike down a same-sex-marriage ban 
using rational-basis-with-bite review? That is unclear. But it should be 
noted that the Lawrence Court struck down Texas’s same-sex sodomy 
ban.48 Further, two state supreme courts—using a rational-basis-with-
bite standard under their own state constitutions—struck down their 
respective states’ reservation of marriage for different-sex couples.49 In 
Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court struck down the state’s re-
serving the benefits of marriage for different-sex couples.50 In 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts struck down that state’s same-sex-marriage ban on ra-
tional-basis grounds.51 
Some courts have held that same-sex-marriage bans pass muster 
under the most deferential form of rational basis review,52 although 
even those decisions are not without their detractors.53 To understand 
why same-sex-marriage bans might be held to fail even deferential ra-
tional basis review, it is helpful to consider the state and individual in-
terests promoted by marriage. 
 
 47. Id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Moral disapproval of this 
group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational 
basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”).  
 48. Id. at 578–79. 
 49. Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969–70 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. 
State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). 
 50.  Baker, 744 A.2d at 886 (“[W]e conclude that none of the interests asserted by the State 
provides a reasonable and just basis for the continued exclusion of same-sex couples from the 
benefits incident to a civil marriage license under Vermont law.”). The court rejected employing 
the tougher heightened scrutiny test that would be triggered were the statute to be discriminating 
on the basis of sex. See id. at 880 n.13. For a discussion of why the Vermont Supreme Court’s 
discussion of sex-based discrimination was in error, see generally Mark Strasser, Mission Impossible: 
On Baker, Equal Benefits, and the Imposition of Stigma, 9 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts J. 1 (2000). 
 51. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 (“For the reasons we explain below, we conclude that the 
marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due process or equal protection. 
Because the statute does not survive rational basis review, we do not consider the plaintiffs’ argu-
ments that this case merits strict judicial scrutiny.”). 
 52. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9, 12 (N.Y. 2006) (“[T]here is a rational basis for 
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples” and “[r]ational basis scrutiny is highly indulgent to-
wards the State’s classifications.”). 
 53. Id. at 30 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (“Although the classification challenged here should 
be analyzed using heightened scrutiny, it does not satisfy even rational-basis review, which re-
quires that the classification ‘rationally further a legitimate state interest.’” (quoting Affronti v. 
Crosson, 95 N.Y.2d 713, 718 (2001))). 
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B. Due Process 
Just as there are differing tiers of scrutiny in equal-protection anal-
ysis, there are differing tiers of scrutiny in due process analysis. But 
under substantive due process review, statutes are examined either with 
strict scrutiny or with rational basis review.54 
Relatively few interests trigger strict scrutiny,55 although the inter-
est in marriage is one of them.56 At least one issue is whether same-
sex-marriage bans trigger strict scrutiny because they “interfere di-
rectly and substantially with the right to marry.”57 
In Loving, the Court noted that the “freedom to marry has long 
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the or-
derly pursuit of happiness by free [individuals].”58 Why is that right so 
important to individuals? That was spelled out more fully in later 
cases.59 For example, in Turner v. Safley, the Court explained that there 
are several individual interests implicated in marriage. Marriages “are 
expressions of emotional support and public commitment,”60 and have 
“spiritual significance.”61 Further, “marital status often is a precondi-
tion to the receipt of government benefits.”62 Needless to say, all of 
these interests are implicated whether the couple is composed of indi-
viduals of the same sex or of different sexes. 
The Loving Court suggested that marriage is “fundamental to our 
 
 54. Consider the following: 
If the interest at issue is not a fundamental right, the court applies a more flexible 
standard, rational basis review, which asks whether the law is rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose. . . . On the other hand, if the court deems the asserted 
interest a fundamental right, it must apply strict scrutiny to determine whether the law 
in question is necessary to further a compelling government interest.  
Alexis M. Etow, Comment, No Toy for You! The Healthy Food Incentives Ordinance: Paternalism or 
Consumer Protection?, 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 1503, 1520 (2012) (citation omitted). 
 55.  Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) (noting that the Due Process 
Clause does not protect “any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions”). See Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“Our law affords constitutional pro-
tection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing, and education.” (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 
(1977))). 
 56. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (discussing a “fundamental liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause, the freedom to marry”). 
 57. Id. at 387. 
 58. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966). 
 59. E.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 96. 
 62. Id. 
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very existence and survival.”63 Why is that so? Two very different kinds 
of answers may be offered. First, as the Court later explained in 
Turner,64 marriage is important for adults. When adults thrive, society 
benefits as well. Second, when referring to society’s existence and sur-
vival,65 the Loving Court may have been referring to the next genera-
tion. But if that was the Court’s meaning, it is not surprising that the 
Court spent so little time on the matter,66 because Virginia had argued 
that it was prohibiting interracial marriage for the sake of the children 
who might be born.67 
 Suppose that the Court was focusing on the next generation but 
did not want to appear to be second-guessing the legislative judgment 
that children were better off not being born into interracial homes.68 
A number of points might be made about how this argument applies 
in the context of same-sex couples. First, children are thriving in homes 
where they are being raised by same-sex couples,69 so it is not as if 
same-sex couples should be prevented from marrying because they are 
somehow a danger to children. Indeed, a recent study70 touted as es-
tablishing that children raised by same-sex couples do not do well71 
seems better cited as reaching a different conclusion. The focus of the 
 
 63. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 64. Turner, 482 U.S. at 95–96. 
 65. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 66. Mark Strasser, Perry, Same-Sex Marriage, and Federal Constitutional Guarantees, 12 En-
gage: J. Federalist Soc’y Prac. Groups 166, 166 (2011) (“[T]he Loving opinion nowhere even 
mentions children.”). 
 67. Id. (“The Court’s reticence on this subject is quite understandable when one considers 
Virginia’s justification for its anti-miscegenation policy, namely, that the state wanted to preclude 
interracial marriage for the sake of the children that might be born of such unions.”). 
 68. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8 (“[T]he State argues [that] the scientific evidence is substantially 
in doubt and, consequently, this Court should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in 
adopting its policy of discouraging interracial marriages.”). 
 69. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 874 (Iowa 2009) (“Many leading organizations, 
including the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychiatric Association, the Amer-
ican Psychological Association, the National Association of Social Workers, and the Child Wel-
fare League of America, weighed the available research and supported the conclusion that gay 
and lesbian parents are as effective as heterosexual parents in raising children.”). 
 70. Mark Regnerus, How Different Are the Adult Children of Parents Who Have Same-Sex 
Relationships? Findings from the New Family Structures Study, 41 Soc. Sci. Res. 752 (2012). 
 71. See Benedict Carey, Debate on a Study Examining Gay Parents, N.Y. Times (June 11, 
2012), http://nyti.ms/16yhKoA (“The study found more psychological and social problems 
among young adults from broken homes who had a gay parent.”); Janice Shaw Crouse, Two Dad-
dies Dilemma: Study Pokes Holes in Same-Sex Parenting Propaganda, Wash. Times (June 14, 2012), 
http://bit.ly/10cHwfo (“A new study released earlier this month reinforces what social scientists 
have known for ages: Traditional families produce more stable children.”). 
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study was not in particular on those children who had been raised by 
same-sex parents but, instead, on those children who had a parent who, 
at some time in his or her life, had experienced a sexual relationship 
with someone of the same sex. But it is, of course, true that such a 
criterion does not focus on individuals raised by same-sex parents.72 
Indeed, one of the points in the study is that children fare better in 
planned GLB families than in other families involving a lesbian or gay 
parent and that there is too little focus on the latter families.73 Ironi-
cally, this study might be cited in support of the proposition that same-
sex couples should be allowed to marry, given the recognition that 
“children in planned GLB families seem to fare comparatively well.”74 
Same-sex-marriage opponents seem not to realize the study’s im-
plications, since it seems to be suggesting that by grouping the children 
of the planned GLB families with the children of the non-planned fam-
ilies, the reported average welfare of the child is lower than it would 
have been if the sample had only been composed of children in planned 
GLB families. But, if permitting same-sex couples to marry might 
mean that there would be more planned births and more thriving chil-
dren, then this is an additional reason to recognize same-sex mar-
riage.75 
Even if the data had not supported that children are doing well in 
stable homes headed by same-sex parents, it would not support refus-
ing to recognize same-sex marriage. Studies show that children raised 
by single or divorced parents, on average, do not do as well as children 
raised in two-parent, low-conflict homes where there has been no di-
vorce.76 But, this does not mean that people who are at greater risk of 
 
 72. See Nathaniel Frank, Op-Ed, Dad and Dad vs. Mom and Dad, L.A. Times (June 13, 
2012), http://lat.ms/17eybYg (“[O]nly a small proportion of its sample spent more than a few 
years living in a household headed by a same-sex couple.”). 
 73. See Regnerus, supra note 70, at 765 (“Child outcomes in stable, ‘planned’ GLB families 
and those that are the product of previous heterosexual unions are quite likely distinctive.”). 
 74. Id. at 766 (“While previous studies suggest that children in planned GLB families seem 
to fare comparatively well, their actual representativeness among all GLB families in the US may 
be more modest than research based on convenience samples has presumed.”). 
 75. Cf. W. Bradford Wilcox & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bringing Up Baby: Adoption, Mar-
riage, and the Best Interests of the Child, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 883, 898 (2006) (“Children 
appear most likely to thrive socially, emotionally, and educationally when they are reared in an 
intact or adoptive family headed by a married couple.”). 
 76. Frank, supra note 72, at 15 (“Like the Regnerus paper, all these studies show is that 
divorce and single-parenthood raise risks for kids.”); see also Sandra Keen McGlothlin, No More 
“Rag Dolls in the Corner”: A Proposal to Give Children in Custody Disputes a Voice, Respect, Dignity, 
and Hope, 11 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 67, 85 (2008) (“[C]hildren who live in homes of elevated hostility 
due to divorce or separation and high conflict custody or visitation disputes are more likely to get 
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divorce should not be permitted to marry. Nor does it mean that they 
should not be permitted to raise children. 
Marriage provides stability for children and adults, which is a rea-
son that same-sex couples should also be permitted to marry.77 Society 
both does and should permit both good and great parents to marry, 
because doing so will help the children who are being raised by those 
parents. Thus, merely because someone is not a great parent does not 
mean that the individual is not a good parent and certainly does not 
mean that the individual should not be allowed to raise children. 
Additionally, society does and should permit individuals to marry 
who will not or perhaps cannot become parents, because the individu-
als themselves and society as a whole are helped by permitting them to 
marry as well. As Chief Judge Kaye pointed out in her dissent in Her-
nandez v. Robles, the “relevant question here is whether there exists a 
rational basis for excluding same-sex couples from marriage.”78 Differ-
ent sex couples will continue to get married and stay married even if 
same-sex couples are also permitted to marry. This is not a zero-sum 
game—“[t]here are enough marriage licenses to go around for every-
one.”79 
Yet, if same-sex-marriage bans are not benefitting different-sex 
couples or their families and are positively harming same-sex couples 
and their families, 80 then it is difficult to see how such bans can be 
upheld on rational basis grounds. Suppose, however, that such bans are 
upheld. This would mean that a state could prohibit the celebration of 
such marriages within that state, although a separate issue involves the 
conditions, if any, under which states must recognize marriages, validly 
celebrated elsewhere. 
 
into serious trouble with the law.”). 
 77. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Matter of Time, 54 Orange Cnty. Law., May 2012, at 16, 18 
(“Children in same-sex households thus benefit from the stability marriage provides in the same 
way it is thought that marriage is best for raising children when there are heterosexual parents.”). 
 78. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 30 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Strasser, supra note 66, at 167 (“It is not as if such bans make it more likely that differ-
ent-sex couples will marry or remain married. Instead, such bans merely impose a burden on 
same-sex couples and their families without bringing about any offsetting benefits for anyone 
else.”). 
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C. Privileges and Immunities 
Traditionally, the law of the domicile governs the validity of mar-
riages.81 Members of a couple who cannot marry in their domicile will 
not be able to force the domicile to recognize their marriage merely 
because they married in a different jurisdiction one weekend where 
their union was permitted.82 Suppose, for example, a couple marries in 
accordance with the law of their domicile, fully expecting to remain in 
their domicile. They remain for several years and, perhaps, are raising 
children. Suppose, however, that one member of the couple receives a 
job offer in another state where such marriages are prohibited. One 
issue that might be raised is whether the latter state could refuse to 
recognize this couple’s marriage, i.e., the price of moving to the new 
state would be the surrender of their marriage. 
The right to travel is recognized as one of the privileges and im-
munities afforded constitutional protection.83 This right includes not 
only the right to travel through states, but also the right to emigrate to 
a new state.84 To justify imposing a burden on the right to travel, states 
must do more than merely show that they have a legitimate interest at 
stake and that the imposed burden is rationally related to the promo-
tion of that interest.85 Rather, if the right to travel is implicated, the 
state must have important interests at stake and the means adopted 
must be closely tailored to the promotion of those interests.86 
Right to travel guarantees are not triggered merely because in-sta-
ters have some benefits that out-of-staters do not. For example, a state 
 
 81. Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & W. James Denvil, Availability of Spousal Privileges for Same-
Sex Couples, 11 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class 224, 241 (2011) (“Federal and 
state courts agree that the law of the couple’s state of domicile governs the validity of the mar-
riage.”). 
 82. Strasser, supra note 43, at 628 (“[T]he domicile at the time of the marriage . . . deter-
mine[s] the marriage’s validity, notwithstanding that the marriage was valid where celebrated”). 
 83. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–04 (1999). 
 84. Id. at 500 (“The ‘right to travel’ discussed in our cases embraces at least three different 
components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the 
right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present 
in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right 
to be treated like other citizens of that State.”). 
 85. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (“[W]e reject appellants’ argument 
that a mere showing of a rational relationship between the waiting period and these four admit-
tedly permissible state objectives will suffice to justify the classification.”). 
 86. See id. (“But in moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees 
were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise 
of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is un-
constitutional.”). 
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can give preferential treatment to in-staters with respect to recrea-
tional hunting.87 The Court has made clear that the interest at issue 
must be sufficiently “fundamental”88 to trigger the relevant protec-
tions. But “fundamental” for right to travel purposes is not equivalent 
to “fundamental” for due process purposes. For example, although 
there is no fundamental right to public assistance, public assistance 
benefits are sufficiently fundamental for right to travel purposes to 
trigger the relevant protections.89 Additionally, there is no fundamen-
tal right to nonemergency medical care, although the right to receive 
such care is sufficiently fundamental to trigger right to travel protec-
tions.90 
One of the criteria used to determine whether an interest is suffi-
ciently fundamental involves whether its denial is “apt to deter migra-
tion.”91 Yet, being forced to surrender one’s marriage at the border 
would certainly be a travel deterrent,92 and it is hard to see how the 
Court could suggest that one’s marriage is not a sufficiently fundamen-
tal interest to trigger right to travel protections. 
Even so, states could still refuse to recognize marriages validly cel-
ebrated in other domiciles if the implicated interests were sufficiently 
strong and if the denial was sufficiently closely tailored to the promo-
tion of those interests. But states have not yet asserted particularly 
compelling interests that are actually promoted by the refusal to rec-
ognize same-sex-marriage bans.93 
Even if it were true that the equal-protection and due-process 
guarantees offered no protection to same-sex marriages, those mar-
riages validly celebrated in the domicile are protected by privileges-
and-immunities guarantees. A separate issue involves whether individ-
uals were actually domiciled in the state where they married, but that 
 
 87. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 378–88 (1978). 
 88. Id. at 388. 
 89. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634. 
 90. See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974). 
 91. Id. at 257. 
 92. Cf. Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of Law Argu-
ments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 499, 508–09 (1995) (discussing 
“conditioning the right to enter or reenter the state on the individual’s consent to invalidation of 
the marriage compels the individual to surrender one constitutionally protected right, marriage, 
in return for another, travel”). 
 93. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 30 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (“Alt-
hough a number of interests have been proffered in support of the challenged classification at 
issue, none is rationally furthered by the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.”). 
  
301] The Unconstitutionality of Same-Sex-Marriage Bans 
 317 
is an issue that courts must address at other times too94 and, thus, is no 
bar to the analysis here. 
D. Full Faith and Credit 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes certain limitations on 
the states, although Congress has been authorized to modify full-faith-
and-credit guarantees under certain conditions. Even if one ignores 
equal-protection guarantees, there is reason to think that Congress ex-
ceeded its authority when passing the Defense of Marriage Act, which 
will have implications for a variety of states. 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause specifies: 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, 
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.95 
There is some controversy over whether this Clause only author-
izes Congress to increase the credit due to acts, records, and juridical 
proceedings or whether it also authorizes Congress to decrease the 
credit that is due.96 Regardless of how that debate is resolved, there are 
other reasons to believe that Congress exceeded its authority when 
passing the full-faith-and-credit provision of DOMA.97 That provision 
reads: 
No state, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, 
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial 
 
 94. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945) (“As to the truth or existence 
of a fact, like that of domicil, upon which depends the power to exert judicial authority, a State 
not a party to the exertion of such judicial authority in another State but seriously affected by it 
has a right, when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to ascertain the truth or existence of 
that crucial fact.”). 
 95. U.S. Const. art IV, § 1. 
 96. See Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co. 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (1980) (“[W]hile Congress 
clearly has the power to increase the measure of faith and credit that a State must accord to the 
laws or judgments of another State, there is at least some question whether Congress may cut 
back on the measure of faith and credit required by a decision of this Court.”). 
 97. DOMA contains two provisions; the provision specifying which marriages will be rec-
ognized for federal purposes reads:  
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, 
the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife. 
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
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proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respect-
ing a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as 
a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, 
or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.98 
When authorizing states to ignore same-sex marriages celebrated 
in sister states, Congress is not merely promoting federalism by au-
thorizing states to refuse to recognize any marriage that they deem 
contrary to local policy. Instead, Congress is picking out one kind of 
marriage in particular and subjecting it to unique burdens. Even if 
Congress has the power to decrease the full-faith-and-credit guaran-
tees, it must do so via general laws. If picking out one type of valid 
marriage for adverse treatment passes the generality requirement, then 
the term general has no meaning.99 
Another issue to be explored is the effect of the DOMA full-faith-
and-credit provision. Although a justification for its passage was that 
domiciles would not be forced to recognize their domiciliaries’ same-
sex marriages celebrated elsewhere,100 domiciles would not have been 
forced to recognize these marriages even without DOMA. Suppose, 
for example, that Ohio same-sex domiciliaries go to Iowa, marry, and 
then return demanding that their marriage be recognized. Because 
Ohio is the domicile at the time of the marriage, it can refuse to rec-
ognize the Iowa union even without DOMA. Therefore, DOMA does 
not give the domicile at the time of the marriage a power that it does 
not have already.101 
Perhaps DOMA gives subsequent domiciles or non-domiciles the 
power not to recognize a marriage validly celebrated elsewhere,102 alt-
hough even that conclusion may not be warranted. Basically, DOMA 
 
 98. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
 99. See Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and 
the Constitution, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 279, 299 (1997) (“The term ‘general’ has no force if DOMA 
is sufficiently general to meet the relevant standard.”). 
 100. See Krista Stone-Manista, Parents in Illinois Are Parents in Oklahoma Too: An Argument 
for Mandatory Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Adoptions, 19 Law & Sexuality: Rev. Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual & Transgender Legal Issues 137, 146–47 (2010). 
 101. See Strasser, supra note 43, at 629 (“As the Ohio treatment of first cousin and uncle-
niece marriages illustrates, domiciles already had the power to refuse to recognize those marriages 
of their domiciliaries that contravened local law, even if those marriages were validly celebrated 
elsewhere.”). 
 102. Mark Strasser, Some Observations About DOMA, Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic 
Partnerships, 30 Cap. U. L. Rev. 363, 371 (2002) (“DOMA might be thought to give a subsequent 
domicile the power to refuse to recognize a marriage which had been validly celebrated in a sister 
domicile years earlier or, perhaps, to give a non-domiciliary state the power to refuse to recognize 
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says that full-faith-and-credit guarantees do not require the recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages validly celebrated elsewhere. But, a differ-
ent question is whether such marriages must be recognized because of 
other guarantees, e.g., privileges and immunities. The Court has al-
ready made clear that Congress does not have the power to authorize 
states to violate privileges-and-immunities guarantees. “[T]he Citizen-
ship Clause of [the Fourteenth] Amendment is a limitation on the pow-
ers of the National Government as well as the States.”103 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never authoritatively construed the 
DOMA full-faith-and-credit provision, so its reach is unclear.104 One 
possible interpretation of the law is that it not only applies to the same-
sex marriages celebrated elsewhere but to divorce judgments as well.105 
This would mean that if a same-sex couple were to divorce in one state 
and if the divorce judgment included a property division, then courts 
in a sister state would be authorized by DOMA to refuse to honor that 
property division.106 Bracketing the public policy implications of per-
mitting individuals to avoid their court-imposed obligations by simply 
moving to a forum that refuses to enforce the obligation, a separate 
point is that absent the federal DOMA, states would not be permitted 
to ignore judgments validly issued in a sister state.107 
 
a same-sex marriage validly celebrated elsewhere.”). 
 103. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999). 
 104. See Mark D. Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role in Determining What Full Faith and Credit 
Requires: An Additional Argument, 41 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 7, 31 (2010) (discussing different possible 
interpretations of DOMA). 
 105. Nick Tarasen, Comment, Untangling the Knot: Finding a Forum for Same-Sex Divorces 
in the State of Celebration, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1585, 1620 (2011) (“DOMA, by its plain text, entitles 
hostile states to completely ignore a state-of-celebration divorce (and, potentially, any down-
stream judgments) as ‘arising from’ a same-sex marriage.”). 
 106. See Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the United States, 54 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 257, 267 (2006) (“To the extent that a claim in the second state requires acceptance of 
its legal basis under the law of a state permitting same-sex legal relationships (e.g., that the claim-
ant is entitled to a decree of dissolution, for a division of property, for support, and the like), it 
will not be entertained if the second state follows, in whatever form, a DOMA-type policy.”). 
 107. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (“So, when a court of one state 
acting in accord with the requirements of procedural due process alters the marital status of one 
domiciled in that state by granting him a divorce from his absent spouse, we cannot say its decree 
should be excepted from the full faith and credit clause merely because its enforcement or recog-
nition in another state would conflict with the policy of the latter.”). 
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Suppose then that the DOMA full-faith-and-credit provision is ei-
ther struck down108 or repealed.109 In that event, states would no 
longer be authorized by Congress to refuse to give full faith and credit 
to divorce judgments validly issued in other states. While it is unclear 
whether Congress has the power to authorize states to refuse to credit 
judgments validly issued in other states, it is clear that, absent such au-
thorization, states must give full faith and credit to judgments validly 
issued in sister states.110 This means that state mini-DOMAs, which 
specify that such judgments not be given credit, will be unconstitu-
tional in whole or in part. 
III. Conclusion 
Same-sex-marriage bans implicate a number of federal constitu-
tional guarantees. Because such bans undermine rather than promote 
societal and individual interests, they should be struck down on  
rational-basis grounds and certainly cannot withstand more demand-
ing scrutiny. Even if one ignores due-process and equal-protection 
protections, some same-sex marriages must be recognized because of 
privileges-and-immunities guarantees. Finally, states are precluded by 
the Constitution from refusing to recognize all judgments of divorce 
involving same-sex couples, because the only possible justificatory ba-
sis for such a refusal itself would involve an overreaching Congress. In 
short, there are numerous federal constitutional bases upon which the 
Court should find that current same-sex-marriage bans do not pass 
muster. 
 
 108. Several courts have struck down the DOMA provision defining marriage for federal 
purposes. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); 
Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.), cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012); In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 109. Bills have been introduced to repeal the provision. See, e.g., Respect for Marriage Act, 
H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 110. See Williams, 317 U.S. at 303. 
